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My aim is to show that, in Posterior Analytics B 8, the conception of lunar eclipse brought about 
by pre-demonstrative knowledge (hoti) is deeply vague and radically different from the one 
obtained by demonstrative knowledge (dioti).  
 
 
Introduction 
 
At the controversial chapter 8 of Book B of the Posterior Analytics (hereafter APo), 
Aristotle presents a new approach to the set of problems discussed in the puzzling 
chapters 3-7, concerning the relations between definitions and demonstrations. At the last 
paragraph, a list of results (presumably) achieved along the chapter is provided:  
[…] it has been said (a) how the what it is is grasped and comes to be known, so that (b) neither 
syllogism nor demonstration of the what it is comes to be, although (c) it becomes clear through 
syllogism and demonstration. Therefore, (d) neither is possible to know the what it is (from which 
the cause is other) without demonstration (b’) nor there is demonstration of it, (e) as we have said 
in the puzzles (APo B 8, 93b15-20). 
The clause a announces, in general lines, the main result (presumably) achieved by 
the chapter; c seems to explain d; b’ repeats b. As alluded by e, in the so-called “puzzles” 
(chapters 3-7), b and d were taken to be incompatible. Nevertheless, Aristotle concludes 
B 8 assuming that both are true, indicating his commitment to a comprehension of b and 
d according to which the incompatibility was merely apparent.1 Indeed, such an 
incompatibility can be avoided by assuming that b applies only to accounts belonging to 
the second one among the four types of definition listed in APo B 10 (logos ho dêlôn dia 
                                                          
1 The inconsistency can be avoided by assuming that b applies only to accounts belonging to the 
second one among the four types of definition listed in APo B 10 (logos ho dêlôn dia ti estin, 
93b39), which are called “syllogistic definitions” by Deslauriers (2007). 
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ti estin, 93b39)2, an assumption supported by Aristotle’s explicit restriction of d to those 
objects mentioned at APo B 9, whose cause is different3 (heteron ti aition). Its 
incompatibility with b, of course, is not the only difficulty in which d is involved. As 
noted by Barnes (2002, p. 212), it is far from being clear how Aristotle obtains d along 
the chapter: 
Strongly construed, this claim <“Without a demonstration you cannot get to know what something 
is”> is entirely unsupported: B 8 has done nothing to show that we can only come to grasp a 
definition by first constructing an appropriate demonstration. 
It is not my purpose to offer a comprehensive interpretation of APo B 8. Instead, 
my aim is to catch attention to some consequences of c on what is granted by the 
knowledge of that (hoti) in APo B 8. In fact, given that what certain things are, according 
to c, become clear (only) by demonstration, it is reasonable to expect that, for Aristotle, 
(c*) without their corresponding demonstrations, what those things are, in some sense to 
be specified, is unclear. Consequently, the pre-demonstrative knowledge (hoti) of the 
lunar eclipse brought about in APo B 8 (93a39-93b3) has to presuppose an unclear 
conception of this astronomical phenomenon. Facing this scenario, I intend to show that 
the conception of lunar eclipse presupposed by the pre-demonstrative knowledge (hoti) 
in APo B 8 is deeply vague and distinct from the one achieved by demonstration. 
 
1. Unclear demonstrandum 
 
As already said, there seems to be an explanatory link connecting the clauses c and 
d in the last paragraph of APo B 8: (d) it is not possible to know what something is without 
demonstration because (c) what something is becomes clear through demonstration. 
Aristotle seems to think that, before obtaining the relevant demonstration, an astronomer, 
for example, would never know what a lunar eclipse is, except in an unclear manner. 
Presupposed by c, this unclear manner seems to correspond to the type of knowledge 
                                                          
2 Deslauriers (2007) calls those accounts “syllogistic definitions”, since their definientia can be 
converted into syllogisms. 
3 On the question of knowing whether Aristotle has in mind items whose cause is different from 
the essence or from the substance, see Bronstein (2016, p. 134-137), Charles (1991, p. 236-238) 
and Chiba (2012, p. 193). 
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alluded by Aristotle in 93a22, according to which the scientist knows merely some 
features of the investigated object or “something of the thing” (ti autou tou pragmatos). 
Commenting on this imprecise and pre-demonstrative knowledge, Barnes (2002, p. 218) 
briefly suggests the examination of two other texts that could help us to understand what 
Aristotle could have in mind: 
It seems, then, that the ‘something’ (93a22) which we grasp must be a part of the essence of the 
object. Met. Z 17, 1041b2-9, and H 4, 1044b 9-15, suggest that the ‘something’ is the matter of 
the object, and that we are still in search of its form; alternatively, we might take the ‘something’ 
for the kind or genus of the object, and think that we are still in search of its difference.  
As well observed by Barnes, the mentioned passage of Metaphysics Z 17 (specially 
its final lines) suggests that, for Aristotle, the formal component of the hylemorphic 
explanandum is the essence of the item under investigation and, one presumes, something 
not (fully) known when the why-question concerning its hylemorphic unit with the 
material component emerges. Here is how Bostock (2003) translates the relevant 
statement: 
So what is sought is the cause by which the matter is so-and-so, i.e. the form. And that is the 
substance (Metaphysics Z 17, 1041b7-9). 
The relations between APo B 8 and Metaphysics Z 17 are certainly of interest. 
However, they are not the topic on which I want to focus in the present text. Instead, the 
connection between the pre-demonstrative knowledge of APo B 8, also known as the 
knowledge of that (to hoti), and the mentioned passage of Metaphysics H 4 (1044b9-15), 
already pointed out also by Oswaldo Porchat (2000, p. 323, footnote 202), consists on the 
interpretative path to be explored hereafter. 
Metaphysics H 4 and APo B 8 do not give attention to the same type of objects. H 
4 deals with the appropriate matter to each thing and discusses some cases devoid of a 
genuine material cause, to which something analogous plays the role of hypokeimenon.4 
APo B 8 deals with those objects “from which the cause is different” and the definition, 
although indemonstrable, becomes known exclusively through demonstration. 
Nevertheless, there is an intersection between these two different domains, on which lays 
                                                          
4 On the two ways of being a hypokeimenon, see Metaphysics Z 13 (1038b4-6) and Code (2015, 
p. 23-24).   
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one of Aristotle’s favorite cases of demonstrable objects, the lunar eclipse. The relevance 
of H 4 to APo B 8, however, does not end here. In H 4, Aristotle employs, with some 
adaptations, his hylemorphic analysis to the case of the lunar eclipse5 and asserts that the 
account (logos) of the form-like6 of the lunar eclipse (i.e. the privation of light), somehow, 
is unclear (adêlos) until it is tied to the explanans (i.e. the interposition7 of the Earth 
between the Sun and the Moon). According to Aristotle: 
[i] The <cause> qua form is the account; however, [ii] the account <‘privation of light’> is 
unclear, unless it is with the <efficient> cause [τὸ δ’ ὡς εἶδος ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ ἄδηλος ἐὰν μὴ μετὰ 
τῆς αἰτίας ᾖ ὁ λόγος]8 (Metaphysics H 4, 1044b9-15). 
This passage of H 4 seems to involve the same presupposition carried by the clause 
c in APo B 8. Since (c) what something is, according to APo B 8, becomes clear (only) 
through demonstration, (c*) what something is, somehow, is unclear without 
demonstration. In turn, [ii] since the account (logos) of the form-analogue of the lunar 
eclipse (i.e. “privation of light”), according to H 4, is unclear, unless it is with the 
(efficient) cause, (c*) what the lunar eclipse is, somehow, is unclear without the cause 
and, thereby, without a demonstration. Thus, to some extent, by mean of the clauses i and 
ii in H 4, Aristotle corroborates the expectation generated by the clauses c and d in APo 
B 8, namely, c*. Additionally, the clause ii may explain b: (c) what X (e.g. the lunar 
eclipse) is becomes clear only through demonstration because (i) the logos of the form of 
X (in the case of the lunar eclipse, the privation of light), without the cause (and, therefore, 
without demonstration), is unclear (adêlos). That is why Barnes goes to the point of 
saying that “we are still in search of its form”. Porchat (2000, p. 323 and footnote 202), 
commenting on APo B 8 (93a36-93b2), more precisely, on pre-demonstrative knowledge 
                                                          
5 In fact, the phenomenon of lunar eclipses and sleepiness are peculiar examples, since they do 
not involve a genuine material cause, but something analogous. For an accurate reconstruction of 
this chapter, see Code (2015). 
6 Aristotle refers to the privation of light as “to hôs eidos”. Hereafter, I employ Code’s expression 
“form-analogue” to refer to it. 
7 Technically, in the Aristotelian cosmology, as pointed out by Code (2015), the Earth does not 
interpose itself between the Sun and the Moon, since it is stationary. 
8 See Code’s translation of the passage: “And [the cause] ‘as form’ is the account, but the account 
is unclear unless the [efficient] cause is added” (2015, p. 25). Reale (2004) seems to understand 
the passage, in his translation, in the same way: “La causa formale è la nozione di eclissi; ma 
questa <la nozione di eclissi> non risulta chiara se non è accompagnata dalla causa efficiente”. 
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of the lunar eclipse, takes the same direction. He understands that, provided only with 
pre-demonstrative knowledge (hoti) of the lunar eclipse, the astronomer knows what the 
lunar eclipse is, but merely in an obscure manner. In order to justify this point, also 
Porchat evokes H 4, assuming that “privation of light”, the linguistic expression or logos 
of the form of the lunar eclipse, is unclear (adêlos) without the cause (and, therefore, 
without demonstration). The more detailed examination of Metaphysics H 4 (1044b 9-
15), however, which I know of, belongs to Code (2015, p. 24-25): 
In the eclipse case, the form-analogue (the cause ὡς εἶ δος) is what he calls the ‘account’ (ὁ λόγος), 
and this is identified as a privation of light. 
As can be noted, Code refers to the privation of light not as the form of the lunar 
eclipse, but as the form-analogue. In order to explain this decision, he points to 
Metaphysics Lambda 4 (1070b16-21), text in which Aristotle takes the light as being a 
form and darkness its privation9: 
These things then have the same elements and principles, but different things have different 
elements; and if we put the matter thus, all things have not the same elements, but analogically 
they have; i.e. one might say that there are three principles – the form, the privation, and the 
matter. But each of these is different for each class, e.g. in colour they are white, black, and 
surface. Again, there is light, darkness, and air; and out of these are produced day and night” 
(Translated by Ross in The Complete Works of Aristotle). 
What is relevant, however, is the fact that, like Barnes and Porchat, also Code 
understands the precise account (logos) described as unclear without the cause in H 4 not 
as the entire essence of the lunar eclipse, but a certain part of it, namely, the privation of 
light, which is identified as the cause hôs eidos. This is not the only way of reading H 4 
                                                          
9 In addition, Code also mentions a certain duality of uses of “logos” that is important to keep in 
mind. In the footnote 35, he says: “Note that in Metaph. Λ4, 1070b16-21, light is a form, darkness 
its privation, and air the matter. In H4, for an eclipse the form-analogue is a privation. In the case 
of a substance, he uses the word ‘logos’ for the account or definition that expresses its form, and 
sometimes uses it for the form it expresses rather than the linguistic item itself. His use of the 
term ‘logos’ has a similar duality of use in connection with definitions of natural phenomena, 
although in the two examples of eclipse and sleep the causal factor corresponding to a substantial 
form is not a form, but rather privation. This general characterization of στέρησις needs to be 
worked out in different ways for different circumstances. For instance, Metaph. Θ1, 1046a31-35 
distinguishes various ways in which something is called στέρησις. Nonetheless, in H4 he is 
speaking at a high level of generality about causes of natural phenomena, and drawing finer 
distinctions that do not generalize is not needed for this purpose”. 
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(1044b 9-15)10, but it is the way that fits better with Aristotle’s words in that chapter. It 
is important to note that the form-analogue (i.e. the privation of light) and the efficient 
cause (i.e. the interposition of the Earth etc.) are respectively the major and middle terms 
of the demonstration of what the lunar eclipse is (or the items expressed by those terms). 
In other words, the demonstrandum “the Moon suffers privation of light”, untied to its 
explanans (i.e. the middle term), in some sense, must be unclear (adêlos) too, since its 
predicate is the form-analogue of the lunar eclipse which is described in H 4 as being 
unclear.11  
In order to address an explanation to the clause ii, according to which the logos of 
the form-analogue of the lunar eclipse is unclear, Code (2015, p. 25) appeals to the 
vagueness or generality of that logos: 
Why is the account unclear without the efficient cause? At least part of the reason is simply that 
without the efficient cause such an account is too general to be something distinctive of just lunar 
eclipses. There are various ways in which something – even the moon – could be deprived of 
light.  
It seems to me that Code takes the account (logos) at issue as being “too general to 
be something distinctive of just lunar eclipses” in order to give room to the unclearness 
that affects it, as if being too general and being distinctive of just lunar eclipses would be 
incompatible. However, the account can be too general and still distinctive of just lunar 
eclipses. As pointed by Bayer (1995), among the two types of syllogism presented in APo 
                                                          
10 For a different interpretation, see Bronstein (2016, p. 98): “The formal cause is the whole 
essence, which must include what Aristotle calls ‘the cause’ (1044b13, 15) […]”. I do not 
understand exactly how the formal cause might be the whole essence of the lunar eclipse, since 
being that the case, the material and efficient causes, one presumes, would be component parts of 
the formal cause. However, there is a line of interpretation, concerning Metaphysics Z 17, that 
tends to argue in such a direction. On its difficulties, see Bostock (2003, p. 239-242). 
11 It seems, therefore, that not only the Stoic notion of apodeixis, but also the Aristotelian one 
may involve an unclear conclusion that becomes clear when demonstrated. The commitment to a 
conclusion that has to be made clear (dêloun) and, thereby, in some sense is unclear, seems to be 
present in De Anima B 2 (413a11ss.) as well. On the “process of analytic clarification” involved 
in this passage, see Lesher (2010, p. 152). See also Burnyeat (1981, p.137-138) on the Stoic notion 
of demonstrative proof (apodeixis): “A demonstrative proof is a valid argument which deduces 
from premises which are both true and evident a conclusion which in itself is non-evident, where 
‘evident’ and ‘non-evident’ are strictly epistemic terms paradigmatically illustrated by what is 
evident or non-evident to sense-perception. The non-evident conclusion is then made known to 
us by the proof, as in the much-cited example ‘If sweat flows through the surface of our bodies, 
there are insensible pores; sweat does flow through the surface of our bodies; therefore, there are 
insensible pores’”.    
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B 8 (93a35-93b7), one serves to identify the phenomenon under investigation. In the lunar 
eclipse case, the syllogism concludes that the Moon suffers eclipse, taking as middle term 
the inability do cast shadows during full moon. This middle term, I presume, is a proprium 
of the lunar eclipse and, as such, it isolates the occurrences of privation of light that are 
also of lunar eclipse from those that are not.12 
To whatever extent, it is important to keep in mind that Metaphysics H 4 (1044b9-
15) carries an implicit comparison between two occurrences of the account (logos) of the 
lunar eclipse: one without the cause (mê meta tês aitias), explicitly pointed out as being 
unclear (adêlos), and one with the cause (meta tês aitias), whose unclearness, one 
presumes, is dissipated by its explanatory connection with the cause. Thus, assuming the 
occurrence without the cause as corresponding to the pre-demonstrative knowledge (hoti) 
vaguely alluded, this occurrence must be equivalent to that one found in APo B 8 (93a35-
93b7) and, thereby, seems to involve only synonymous13 instances of lunar eclipse. 
Nevertheless, it remains to be seen in which sense the pre-demonstrative (hoti) conception 
of lunar eclipse granted in APo B 8 is deeply vague or unclear.  
 
2. How unclear is this pre-demonstrative knowledge (hoti)? 
 
At first, it might sound intriguing to take the expression “privation of light” (and its 
corresponding denotatum, the item it expresses) as being unclear (adêlos). Code, for 
example, cautiously speaks in terms of an “allegedly” unclear logos. Bostock (2003, p. 
275) goes further and tries to correct Aristotle’s statement in H 4 (1044b9-15): 
It <i.e. the lunar eclipse> also has a formal cause, which is the definition of what an eclipse is. 
Aristotle recommends us to build into this definition a specification of the efficient cause […]. 
He says that unless we do this, the definition will not be ‘clear’, but that does not seem to be right: 
                                                          
12 Because its middle term is a proprium (idion) of the lunar eclipse (or of an eclipsed moon), the 
syllogism at issue guarantees all the instances of privation of light under consideration not to be 
homonymous, but synonymous (in the Aristotelian senses). In other words, they have the same 
cause (as anticipated by APo B 2, specially 89b37-38 and 90a5-7), implying that they all share 
the same (still unknown) essence or that they all belong to the same natural kind, as some 
interpreters prefer. However, it is hard to see how the scientist could recognize such a middle term 
as being a proprium of the lunar eclipse without knowing its cause, which seems to provide some 
support to Bolton’s (1976) view. 
13 Always in the Aristotelian sense. 
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the original definition was perfectly ‘clear’. What he has in mind, one presumes, is that the 
expanded definition will give a more informative answer to the question: ‘What is an eclipse?’. 
Like other interpreters, Bostock tries to deflate Aristotle’s statement that the logos 
of the form-analogue of the lunar eclipse (identified as the privation of light) is unclear 
(adêlos), preferring to say that it is simply or at most incomplete, but not unclear. 
Although being cautious to the point of saying that such a logos is “allegedly” unclear, 
Code (2015) takes a different direction, pointing out the curious way by which Aristotle 
intends to clarify the mentioned logos. According to Code (2015, p. 25):  
[…] Aristotle’s proposal is not that this <i.e. the unclear logos> is clarified by adding some more 
determinate specification of observable features of the moon’s light deprivation, or a fuller 
phenomenological description of what eclipses look like to observers. The proposal is rather that 
this (allegedly unclear) logos is made clear by accompanying it with a statement of the efficient 
cause that is responsible for the subject, the moon, having that property, or form-analogue. 
It is surely pertinent to ask why Aristotle’s proposal does not consist on “adding 
some more determinate specification of observable feature of the moon’s light 
deprivation, or a fuller phenomenological description of what eclipses look like to 
observers”. Perhaps, APo B 8 (93b15-20) could help on addressing an explanation. The 
clause c, according to which what something is becomes clear (only) through 
demonstration, generates the expectation that the essences at issue cannot be made clear 
unless through demonstration and, thereby, through causal knowledge. Now, causal 
knowledge might be exactly what Aristotle had in mind when wrote H 4 (1044b9-15) by 
implicitly suggesting that the logos of the form-analogue of the lunar eclipse becomes 
clear through its link with the (efficient) cause. In other words, the clause c in APo B 8 
suggests that the procedure of clarification of an essence involves demonstrative and, 
therefore, causal knowledge, which seems to be corroborated in H 4. Certainly, this is not 
the entire explanation for the curious way, pointed out by Code, by which Aristotle 
intends to clarify the unclear account of the form-analogue of the lunar eclipse in H 4. 
The point here is modest and consist in seeing that, under the consideration of the clause 
c, the curious clarification procedure alluded by Aristotle in H 4 becomes less surprising 
and more expected. A different issue, of course, involves knowing how, for Aristotle, the 
causal knowledge clarifies that logos. 
Nevertheless, the task promised above consists in showing how the logos of the 
form-analogue of the lunar eclipse (corresponding to the privation of light) can be both 
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distinctive of just lunar eclipses and still unclear (or too general). As anticipated, the pre-
demonstrative (hoti) conception of lunar eclipse refers only to synonymous instances of 
this astronomical phenomenon due to the proprium to which it is tied (i.e. the inability to 
cast shadows during full moon etc.), which is the middle term of the syllogism alluded in 
93a39-93b3. In turn, such a conception, I claim, is deeply vague and maybe to the point 
of being equivocal. One way of seeing that consists in paying attention to some of 
Aristotle’s presuppositions in APo B 8 (93b3-6). The detailed examination of this text 
reveals that the pre-demonstrative (hoti) conception of lunar eclipse granted by the 
syllogism of 93a39-93b3 is radically different from the one granted by demonstrative 
knowledge. Here is the relevant passage:  
However, being granted that ‘A’ <i.e. eclipse> is predicated of C <i.e. Moon>, to seek ‘Why is it 
predicated?’ is to seek ‘what is B?’: whether it is (1) interposition <of the Earth between the Sun 
and the Moon> or (2) rotation of the Moon <on its own axis> or (3) quenching <of flames> (APo 
B 8, 93b3-6). 
This text presents a pre-demonstrative (hoti) context in which, for example, the 
astronomer already knows that the Moon suffers privation of light (eclipse), but does not 
yet know why it occurs.14 The astronomer already knows that the lunar eclipse occurs (or 
exists), but does not yet know what the lunar eclipse is. That the Moon suffers the precise 
privation of light also called “lunar eclipse” is granted by the preceding syllogism (93a35-
93b3), which takes the inability to cast shadows during the full moon as middle term and 
serves to identify the phenomenon under investigation.15 That is why the sentences “the 
Moon suffers privation of light” and “the Moon suffers eclipse” can be conflated in one 
                                                          
14 On how to understand the Aristotelian distinction between to know that (hoti) and to know why 
(dioti), I follow Barnes (2002, p. 155): “We might well think we could distinguish between 
understanding a fact and understanding an explanation in less subtle ways than those Aristotle 
devises; but in fact Aristotle, despite his language, is not concerned with this distinction at all: 
rather, he wants to distinguish between understanding a fact ‘through’ its explanation (i.e. 
knowing that P on the basis of Q, where Q explains why P is the case), and understanding a fact 
not though its explanation (i.e. knowing that P on the basis of Q where Q does not explain why P 
is the case). Cases of the second type, which Aristotle divides into two groups, are not, strictly 
speaking, cases of understanding at all; perhaps with ordinary usage in mind, Aristotle is here 
countenancing a weaker sense of ‘understand’ than his official one”.  
15 Bayer (1995). 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy                  J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.13, n.2. p. 96-108, 2019. 
ISSN 1981-9471 - FFLCH/USP                  DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v13i2p96-108 
www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga 
 
 
 
105 
and the same sentence: “the Moon suffers privation of light (eclipse)”. In this context, 
those sentences imply each other.16 
After introducing the explanandum, that is to say, the fact that the Moon suffers 
privation of light (eclipse), Aristotle recognizes its three candidates for the role of 
explanans: (1) the interposition (antiphraxis) of the Earth between the Sun and the Moon, 
(2) rotation (strophê) of the Moon, and (3) quenching (aposbesis) of the lunar surface’s 
fire. It is not easy to reconstruct all of the details involved in each of the running theories, 
but some interpretative assumptions can be safely pointed out. Firstly, the explanation 1 
presupposes the Parmenidean insight of the heliophotism of the Moon17, which implies 
that (β) the Moon is not incandescent. Secondly, the remaining explanations, 2 and 3, do 
not presuppose the Parmenidean insight. Instead, both are committed to the scrapped 
hypothesis according to which (α) the Moon is incandescent. Thirdly, Aristotle takes all 
the three explanations as being genuine answers of one and the same question: (Q) “Why 
the Moon suffers privation of light (eclipse)?”. With these three assumptions in mind, it 
becomes easier to see how deeply general and semantically poor is the pre-demonstrative 
conception of lunar eclipse at issue.  
In fact, since that, for Aristotle, all the three explanations (1, 2 and 3) are genuine 
answers ascribed to the same question, this pre-demonstrative conception of lunar eclipse, 
carried by the question (Q) “Why the Moon suffers privation of light (eclipse)?”, must be 
deeply vague to the point of not presupposing neither that (α) the Moon is incandescent 
nor that (β) the Moon is not incandescent, under penalty of producing an inconsistency 
with some of its answers. In fact, if the question “Why the Moon suffers privation of light 
(eclipse)?” presupposes α, the explanation 1 cannot be a genuine answer. Why not? 
                                                          
16 As it is known, by dealing with the analogous case of thunder in APo B 8 (93b7-12), Aristotle 
goes as far as substituting the predicate of the sentence “the cloud thunders” for the predicate of 
the sentence “the cloud makes noise”. In fact, identified the phenomenon under investigation, as 
occurs in APo B 8 (93a35-93b3), to know that the cloud makes noise implies to know that the 
cloud thunders. Analogously, to know that the Moon suffers privation of light implies to know 
that the Moon suffers eclipse. 
17 As far as I know, Parmenides is responsible for developing a cosmology in which the Moon 
was thought to reflect the Sun’s light. In doing so, he paved the way for the correct comprehension 
of the lunar eclipse by Anaxagoras. On the merits of Parmenides, see Graham (2013, p. 156-159): 
“Parmenides’ insight of heliophotism provides the starting point for a set of implications that 
includes the possibility of explaining eclipses by reference to antiphrasis”. On the merits of 
Anaxagoras, see Burnet (1920, p. 198), Curd (2007, p. 233), and especially Graham & Hintz 
(2007, p. 333). 
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Because the explanation 1 presupposes β, which is incompatible with α. Now, can a 
question and one of its genuine answers be committed to incompatible assumptions?18 
The story ends up in the same results when one assumes that the mentioned question 
presupposes β instead of α. In such a case, the explanations 2 and 3 cannot be genuine 
answers, since both presuppose α, which is incompatible with β. In order to avoid any 
inconsistency involving the question and some of its genuine answers, it is required to 
assume that the conception of lunar eclipse underlying the pre-demonstrative context of 
the question Q is too general, to the point of not being committed neither to α nor to β. 
Now, if not unclear (adêlos), what such an intriguing privation of light, called “lunar 
eclipse”, might be for an astronomer who does not yet know its cause? In this context, it 
is unknown whether the phenomenon at issue is a privation of solar light or of light 
generated by a flaming Moon that rotates in its own axis or simply quenches from time 
to time. In short, even the fundamental connection between the intriguing lunar eclipse 
and the shadow projection phenomena with which ordinary people are familiar is still 
unknown, so that the pre-demonstrative conception of lunar eclipse at issue cannot be the 
same as the one provided by demonstrative knowledge, since the last one, among other 
things, depends on recognizing such a connection.19 
                                                          
18 An answer cannot be incompatible with the assumptions of its question. Such a requirement 
consists of nothing more than a formal condition to be met by any genuine answer (even by those 
based on false assumptions!). The sentence “The Earth is not in the center of the universe” is not 
a genuine answer to the question “Why is the Earth in the center of the universe?”, but simply the 
rejection of a presupposition on which the question at issue depends in order to be successful. By 
stating the sentence, one rejects the presupposition and annihilates the question. In the same 
direction, see van Fraassen (1980, p. 26). 
19 Some interpreters seem to understand the passage from pre-demonstrative to demonstrative 
knowledge in similar terms. Charles (2000, p. 45), for example, by comparing the first and the 
third kind of definition among those listed in APo B 10, points out a “semantic” difference 
between them: “[…] the first definition is […] general in form, and fails uniquely to identify the 
type of noise in question. While it says that thunder is a type of noise in the clouds, it does not 
state which it is. Thus, the definiens as well as the definienda will be different in the two cases. 
Even if some of the same terms are used (“noise in the clouds”) at Stage 1 they are used to make 
an indefinite claim about a type of noise (tis), while in the second they uniquely identify the 
phenomenon in question”. The expression “noise in the clouds” is precisely the conclusion of the 
demonstration of what thunder is (see APo B 10, 94a 8-10), although formulated as a naming 
expression. Charles seems to think that the same terms (i.e. “noise in the clouds”) might be used 
both in a vague sense (in Stage 1, when the scientist does not know whether or not thunder exists) 
and in a more precise sense (Stage 3, when the scientist already have scientific knowledge). 
Ferejohn (2013, p. 144-145) argues in a similar direction, speaking of a “phenomenal (or ‘thin’) 
conception of thunder”, one that gives place to the scientific conception which is obtainable from 
a scientific demonstration. Thus, it seems that the scientific demonstration promotes the 
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Given this scenario, it is hard to see how the pre-demonstrative conception of lunar 
eclipse in APo B 8, granted by the knowledge of that (hoti), might not be equivocal. 
Instead, it is easier to see why, without demonstration, it is not possible to know what, for 
example, the lunar eclipse is.20 
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